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Abstract 
Environmental managers in Russia face severe problems, both from Soviet-era and continuing 
environmental degradation and due to the weakness of current institutions with responsibilities for 
environmental protection. This paper draws on surveys, a case study of water pollution, and workshops 
on Russian environmental decisionmaking to explore prospects for environmental improvements. Using 
concepts from the regulatory reform literature on next-generation environmental policies, it focuses on the 
use of market incentives, the construction of a civil society, and community involvement, and emphasizes 
that Russian nongovernmental organizations may have a particularly important role to play in improving 
environmental management.  Solidifying their legal base, coalition-building skills, and capability to 
conduct independent, pragmatic policy analyses would enhance their contribution. 
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Environmental Management in the Russian Federation: 
A Next Generation Enigma 
Kris Wernstedt* 
1.  Introduction 
Environment protection in the Russian Federation embodies the enigmatic character 
that Winston Churchill ascribed to Russia in the late 1930s: it is a riddle, wrapped in a 
mystery, inside an enigma. The nation remains stunningly endowed with natural resources 
after the breakup of the former Soviet Union, possessing one-third of the world’s known 
natural gas reserves, one-third of remaining old-growth forests, and 10% of renewable 
freshwater resources.  It also has within its state agencies abundant technical expertise to 
manage and protect these resources, and a nongovernmental organization sector of 
scientifically sophisticated activists.  Yet, in many geographic areas and economic sectors, 
environmental quality continues to deteriorate, resources fall short of demand, and resource 
productivity declines.  Environmental policymaking appears fragmented and many of the 
institutions responsible for it are unstable.  Some commentators have suggested that the 
country and its predecessor Soviet state have long been on the verge of an environmental 
breakdown (see, for example, Feshbach & Friendly, 1992).  Despite widespread indigenous 
and international efforts to raise environmental performance, large-scale improvements in the 
management and quality of Russia’s environment remain elusive.  
My objectives in this paper are twofold.  First, I seek to furnish a better understanding 
of the important institutional and media-specific difficulties that Russian environmental 
managers face at the local and national levels.  Second, I aim to provide the reader with a 
more nuanced view of why many efforts to “fix” Russian environmental management are 
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problematic.  I argue that a de facto next-generation, Western model of environmental 
management and regulation advocated by many policy experts holds promise—a model that 
relies on market incentives, information provision, and community pressure—but it needs to 
be tempered with the well-known failures of Russian institutions and breakdowns in the rule 
of law.  Russian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may have a particularly prominent 
role in the reconnection of the public interest in sustainable development to government 
priorities for environmental protection.  This is consistent with the NGOs’ heady influence as 
vehicles for citizen protest in the late 1980s during the final years of the Soviet era.   
As a preview of the paper, the following section provides a broad-brush background on 
Russian environmental problems and the institutional apparatus that has evolved to address 
them.  Subsequently, the paper delves more deeply into one example of these problems, 
namely pollution associated with oil and gas extraction in Siberian Russia and efforts to 
provide adequate drinking water and wastewater management in the face of this.  This is 
followed by a short conceptual background on next-generation environmental policies in 
Europe and North America.  The following three sections use the Siberian example, results 
from several surveys, and other evidence to explore several themes in next-generation 
policies—the use of market incentives, dependence on rule of law, and the role of 
information in community involvement—and their application to Russian environmental 
policymaking. The paper concludes with several suggestions for improving environmental 
management in Russia that are directed at nongovernmental organizations. 
2.  Background 
The pernicious effects of Russia’s resource misuse outside the country’s borders—in 
such international bodies of water as the Sea of Japan and the Caspian, Baltic, North, and 
Black Seas, and on regional air quality—have long attracted considerable attention from its 
neighbors. In addition, the biotic and geopolitical importance of the country and the 
potentially destabilizing effects of poor environmental conditions make the state of the 
Russian environment a global concern.  Several book-length treatments (Peterson, 1993; 
Pryde, 1995; Feshbach & Friendly, 1992) and popular media coverage of the environmental 
situation in Russia and other former republics of the Soviet Union have brought international 
scrutiny to Russian environmental problems.  Moreover, since the initiation of glasnost in the Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
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1980s and subsequent democratic reforms, nongovernmental organization (NGO) advocacy 
for environmental improvements, media coverage of the state of the environment, and 
official recognition of environmental problems—first in the Soviet Union and subsequently 
in its successor, the Russian Federation—also have raised the domestic visibility of these 
problems.   
Environmental Problems 
The range of environmental concerns in the Russian Federation is well documented by 
official sources (see, for example, State Committee of the Russian Federation on 
Environmental Protection, 1999).  It includes sublimely technical problems related to nuclear 
contamination—including fallout from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident, the storage of 
waste from nearly 30 currently operating nuclear reactors, the dismantling of hundreds of 
nuclear reactors from decommissioned nuclear submarines, and the legacy of nuclear 
weapons production—as well as more mundane but equally devastating troubles of soil 
erosion, rapid land conversion, and air and water pollution.  Through the 1990s, nearly 100 
million Russian citizens in 200 large cities were estimated to be breathing air with pollution 
levels that exceeded Russian ambient air quality standards, and most of the country’s river 
and lakes were classified as “moderately polluted” or “polluted.”   
Although the high rate of environmental violations always has been driven in part by 
environmental standards that have been strict by world norms and thus particularly difficult 
to meet, data from the late 1990s indicate that more than 90 cities had annual concentrations 
of particulate matter and nitrogen dioxide that exceeded World Health Organization 
standards, and about one-half of Russia’s population consumed drinking water that fails to 
meet some standards (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1999).  
Heavy metals, hydrocarbons, and organic chemicals from industrial activity contaminated 
more than 2 million hectares of soil, and industrial activity in many cities probably 
contributed to a high rate of respiratory diseases and a high incidence of lead-related 
childhood mental development problems (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 1999).  Nearly 60% of 3,300 Russians surveyed in the 2000 round of the Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
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Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) reported that bad environmental 
conditions caused or contributed to chronic illnesses in their family (Mroz et al., 2001).1  
The possible causes of the environmental difficulties in the former Soviet Union are 
well known and continue to be problematic. At the most elemental level, the structure of the 
economy in the Soviet era—both its emphasis on rapid heavy industrialization and 
militarization and its reliance on measures of physical output rather than value—was a 
primary driver of environmental degradation. Unless such degradation derailed the 
attainment of production quotas—and without the market price signals found in Western 
economies, this was unusual—it typically was underemphasized or ignored altogether.   
Furthermore, there was no incentive to reinvest and upgrade capital stock and, 
consequently, modernization of the industrial sector lagged behind the West.  Even at the 
close of the 1990s, the average age of industrial plants and equipment in Russia was three 
times that of its counterpart in Western countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development, a problem that continues to hurt the country’s economic 
competitiveness and contributes to poor environmental performance (Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, 2000).  
The deliberate concentration of industrial enterprises during the Soviet era also 
generated extremely high levels of localized pollution.  And unlike Western market 
democracies, which have had their own share of pollution and externalities to deal with, 
during most of the period, no strong constituency either inside or outside the government was 
allowed to gain enough influence to force enterprises to confront the pollution they were 
causing.2  
                                                 
1 Environmental-related illnesses have been discussed in the popular literature (e.g., Specter, 1995) as possible 
drivers for the decreases in the life expectancy of Russians over the last fifteen years.  For males, these 
decreases have been dramatic, particularly in the early 1990s, when life expectancies dropped below 58 years.  
More recent studies, however, have discounted the importance of environmental drivers and attributed much of 
the fall in life expectancies to cardiovascular and alcohol-related illnesses (Walberg et al., 1998). 
2 The Soviet scientific community was an exception in that many scientists were able to organize in relatively 
self-run societies that had some notable environmental achievements.  However, these were largely devoted to 
the protection of natural reserves, ostensibly for the purposes of scientific study, and their involvement in 
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Environmental Institutions 
Prior to the mid 1980s, responsibility for environmental protection in the Soviet Union 
was scattered in a number of  ministries and agencies, with pollution abatement and control 
largely neglected in practice and most enterprises in noncompliance with environmental 
standards.  This began to change with the onset of glasnost and perestroika in the mid 1980s 
as pressure to address environmental degradation increased (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 1999).  The 1987 Law on State Enterprises decentralized 
some of the responsibility for environmental performance and instituted the principle of more 
rational use of and payment for natural resources, as well as ceded more environmental 
protection responsibilities to individual enterprises.  In 1988, the formation of the Union 
Committee for Environmental Protection focused many of these responsibilities in one 
institution and gave higher visibility to environmental protection.  The Union Committee’s 
charge included the regulation and enforcement of environmental standards, management of 
“nature protection,” and the coordination of environmental activities of the various ministries 
and agencies.    
The Union Committee for Environmental Protection transitioned to the Russian 
Federation’s State Committee for Environmental Protection (Goskomekologiya) in 1991.  
That same year, passage of the Russian Federation’s Law on Environmental Protection 
established pollution charges countrywide and provided the legal basis for “environmental 
funds.” These latter compose a three-tiered (federal, regional, local) set of extra-budgetary 
accounts for environmental activities, with more than three-quarters of the revenues for the 
environmental funds contributed by pollution charges (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 1998).  The funds have the potential to be large revenue 
sources for environmental protection but actual payments into them have been modest due to 
inadequate tax collection and enforcement and local resistance to imposing high taxes on 
important industries.  Often the funds have been raided to pay for nonenvironmental 
activities.   
In 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin elevated Goskomekologiya to the more 
powerful Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources.  This ministerial 
status persisted for only three years, however.  Yeltsin reduced the environmental protection 
component of the ministry to a more subordinate State Committee for Environmental Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
6 
Protection after his reelection in 1996—perhaps in response to the strong industry support he 
received in his campaign (Peterson & Bielke, 2001)—and in May 2000, President Vladimir 
Putin eliminated Goskomekologiya altogether and placed its responsibilities and personnel in 
the Federation’s Ministry of Natural Resources. Subsequent efforts to hold a citizen 
referendum on President Putin’s action garnered nearly 2.5 million signatures.  However, 
Russia’s Central Election Commission rejected the attempt on the ground that less than the 
required 2 million signatures were legitimate.  
Most experts believe that the transference of Goskomekologiya functions to the 
Ministry of Natural Resources downplays the importance of environmental protection and 
confirms a trend toward relaxed regulation and increased natural resource exploitation at the 
national level.  Such resource development is seen as a critical component of the Federation’s 
economy and development.  As Peterson and Bielke (2001) note, President Putin himself has 
argued that the Russian mineral resource complex can be the basis for the sustainable 
development of Russia and that natural resources more broadly provide abundant 
opportunities for large-scale investment. These opportunities were identified in a poll of 
some 100 economic experts that the William Davidson Institute at the University of 
Michigan conducted just prior to the 2000 Russian presidential election.  More than 75% of 
the economic experts said the investment opportunities in natural resources were “good” or 
“excellent,” making it the highest rated of the seven possible investment areas that were 
identified. 
The nosedive of the Russian economy throughout most of the 1990s—with real gross 
domestic capita falling by 40%, labor productivity declining, and income inequality and 
underemployment increasing—has further complicated environmental protection efforts by 
making it difficult to garner support for potentially costly environmental measures.  It also 
has diminished the visibility and budget of environmental management agencies, which have 
had to rely increasingly on local funding as central budget allocations from Moscow have 
dropped sharply.  Less than 0.3% of Russia’s federal budget went to the environment 
portfolio under the Yeltsin administration and, in 1999, federal budget allocations to the 
principle environmental protection agency in Russia were less than one-fourth of the amount 
requested (Research Analysts, 2000).  Various authors (Wells & Williams, 1998; Ostergren, Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
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2001) have suggested that government support for protected areas in Russia has declined in 
real terms by 60% to 90% since 1989.  
Monitoring of environmental quality also has suffered from funding shortfalls.  For 
example, although the size of the observational network for water quality was roughly the 
same in 2000 as at the end of the Soviet era 10 years earlier, the quality of the environmental 
data declined due to inadequate staff training, obsolete equipment, irregular maintenance, and 
poor data quality assurance procedures.  Zhulidov (2000, p. 1936) notes that in 1998, fewer 
than 40% of the laboratories that analyze water quality chemistry were certified.  
Furthermore, the infrastructure of municipal drinking water and wastewater treatment 
facilities—which was funded predominantly by central budgets in the Soviet era—has 
deteriorated due to deferred maintenance and insufficient capital investment by local 
municipalities.  These issues probably contributed to significant reported increases in 
gastroenteritis, hepatitis A, and bacterial dysentery in the 1990s (Peterson, 1993).   
3.  Oil and Gas Production in Western Siberia3 
The oil- and gas-rich areas of the western Siberia lowlands in the Tyumen oblast 
provide a useful microcosm of the situation confronting environmental managers across the 
Russian Federation. The sector as a whole is important to the national economy, providing 
more than one-fifth of government revenues and two-fifths of export earnings (Menshikov, 
1999). Throughout the country, oil and gas enterprises have largely been privatized—the 
government share in major Russian oil companies is about 25%—but new capital investment 
in oil extraction and refining and labor and capital productivity are very low compared to 
other parts of the world (McKinsey Global Institute, 1998).  Moreover, although gas 
production remained relatively constant through the 1990s, oil output dropped sharply after 
1990 and, despite a sharp upswing following the ruble devaluation in the late 1990s, still has 
not fully recovered.  Data from 2001 indicate, for example, that while oil production had 
                                                 
3 Information in this section comes from a 1996 study by a Russian-American team of engineers, physical and 
natural scientists, and planners of water quality in the Nizhnevartovsk area of the Tyumen oblast.  Details of this 
study, which was sponsored by the respective Academy of Sciences in Russia and the United States, can be 
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increased more than 20% from 1996, its low point in the post-Soviet era, it’s still  30% below 
1990 production levels (BP, 2001; Energy Information Administration, 2001).   
The decades of energy extraction in western Siberia have clearly degraded 
environmental quality.  Direct contamination of water bodies from spilled oil and brine along 
pipelines and at well sites is readily observable, native forest cover is heavily stressed, local 
air quality has deteriorated, and development at extraction sites, access roads, and towns has 
significantly altered the hydrology of the area.  These changes have probably had some 
negative consequences for the public health of local residents and workers.  For example, 74 
percent of the region’s 300 plus respondents to the RLMS perceive that chronic illnesses in 
their families are due at least in part to poor environmental conditions.  This is the highest 
proportion of the eight Russian regions surveyed (Mroz et al., 2001).   
Within western Siberia in the 130,000 square kilometer Nizhnevartovsk area along the 
Ob River in the Khanty Mansi autonomous region—a region that accounts for roughly one-
half of Russian oil production—problems are particularly acute (see Figure 1). Production in 
Nizhnevartovsk’s giant Samotlor oil field, for example, dropped from roughly 2 million 
barrels per day at the beginning of the 1990s to less than five hundred thousand barrels per 
day in 1996, and more than fifteen hundred oil wells in the region had been abandoned 
(Personal Communication, Nizhnevartovsk Environmental Committee, 1996).  Ninety-two 
percent to 98% of the volume extracted from the field is water due in part to past efforts to 
reinject water to maximize the volume of recovered oil (Personal Communication, 
Nizhnevartovsk Environmental Committee, 1996; The Economist, 2001).  This poses a 
daunting environmental problem: once the water is separated, it receives inadequate 
treatment and often is discharged to receiving surface waters.   
The declining yields around Nizhnevartovsk mean local enterprises have limited funds 
to invest in technology upgrades and pipeline maintenance. While gas pipelines remain 
relatively reliable (since the system has largely been built since the 1970s) and the major oil 
trunklines run by a state-owned monopoly have improved their performance greatly since the 
large spills of the 1970s and 1980s, the field pipelines in Nizhnevartovsk and elsewhere that 
are owned by local producers are more troubling (Sagers, 2000).  Roughly one quarter of 
Nizhnevartovsk’s 11,000 kilometers of pipeline infrastructure need to be replaced every year, 
yet many local producers have insufficient revenues to fund this maintenance. In addition, Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
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high capital costs and barriers to foreign investment arising from the uncertainty of 
production-sharing legislation, shareholder protection, and restrictions on imported physical 
capital limit the upgrading of production and transport facilities.  As a result of chronic 
underinvestment, pipeline leaks that might make front-page news in other parts of the world 
occur regularly.  For instance, during the two-year period from 1994 through 1995, the 
Nizhnevartovsk Environment Committee (NEC), a territorial committee formerly under 
Goskomekologiya, documented more than three thousand illegal spills and pipeline leaks in 
the region, which released nearly sixty thousand barrels of oil.  NEC estimates of 
undocumented spills that are missed because of insufficient monitoring capabilities are ten-
fold higher.  Violations of effluent standards are rampant throughout the region, and NEC 
authorities estimate that only one-fifth of the water purifying systems needed to meet water 
quality requirements are in place and operational (Personal Communication, Nizhnevartovsk 
Environmental Committee, 1996).  
The majority of urban residents in the region have access to treated drinking water, but 
budget constraints preclude testing for some potentially serious acute waterborne diseases 
such as giardia lamblia and cryptosporidium, and authorities do not have the capability to 
monitor either raw or treated water quality for volatile organics and disinfection by-products.  
In addition, demand for treated water outstrips supply.  For example, in the city of 
Nizhnevartovsk—which houses about two-thirds of the region’s residents—estimated 
demand for treated water from the City’s direct filtration plant is more than 50% higher than 
available capacity.  Conveyance losses are endemic, and many residents above the third floor 
of the typical 8- and 16-story high-rise apartment buildings have little or no service much of 
the day. On the wastewater front, the municipal treatment facility receives 50% more 
wastewater than it was designed to treat.  The NEC is urging capacity expansion for both.   
Many of the drinking water and wastewater problems in the region reflect rapid growth.  
Regional population exploded as part of the oil boom, with the population of the city of 
Nizhnevartovsk increasing from roughly sixteen thousand residents in 1970 to nearly 
250,000 residents in the mid-1990s and stabilizing or dropping only slightly since then.  
Despite relatively high per capita incomes, the shift since 1991 to local funding of city 
services—necessitated by the drop in support from central budgets—has meant that funds for 
public infrastructure improvements are limited.  User charges are typically far too low to Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
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cover operation and maintenance costs, let alone capital improvements.  As with many other 
urban areas of Russia, bottled or in-home filtered water is the water of choice for those who 
can afford it.  Even with these precautions, rates of gastrointestinal illnesses are high.   
4.  Incentives, Civil Society, and Information Provision 
Water pollution and the conditions that negate its resolution in the oil fields of western 
Siberia along with other environmental problems in the Russia Federation are relatively well 
known to environmental experts both inside and outside the Russian Federation.  Over the 
last decade, western European and North American governments, foundations, and 
nongovernmental organizations have furnished more than one billion U.S. dollars of 
environmental assistance to state organizations and the nongovernmental sector to try to 
address these problems (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1998; 
Powell, undated).  Much of this assistance—which includes equipment, training, funds for 
the development of indigenous organizations and their operational support, and funds for 
western consultants—has drawn explicitly or implicitly on the “next-generation” model of 
environmental management, an approach that has gained great favor, particularly in the 
United States, since the mid 1990s (Chertow & Esty, 1997; Enterprise for the Environment, 
1998; National Academy of Public Administration, 1997). This model rests more on flexible 
approaches than traditional command-and-control efforts, emphasizing incentives, the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information to guide performance-based efforts and 
encourage community pressure and involvement (Hausker, 1999).  
The uniqueness of the Soviet-era and its aftermath means the application of the Western 
model of next generation environmental policies to Russia warrants some important 
qualifications.  In particular, a critique of next-generation policies voiced by Steinzor (1998) 
and others in the U.S. context—namely the underemphasis on continued strong legislative, 
regulatory, and enforcement underpinnings to environmental management in a next-
generation model—is especially relevant in Russia, where external funders and Russians both 
have noted the critical absence of a “civil society.” In broad terms, this concept refers to a 
web of self-organized, pluralistic independent institutions that can serve as a counterpoint to 
the traditional hegemony of the state.  It includes a respect for and protection of individual 
rights and freedom, adherence to democratic values, participation in civic affairs, respect for Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
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diversity and pluralism, and opportunities for empowerment.  Most centrally, the Russian 
term for civil society, grzhdanskoe obshchestvo, assumes a “society based on a rule of law 
with limited government and sovereign citizens enjoying a comprehensive set of civil rights.” 
(Polischuk, 1997, p. 4).   
Absent such grounding in civil society practice, pure next-generation environmental 
policies are likely to have only limited applicability to Russia.  However, the next-generation 
model’s foundation of incentives, information provision, and empowerment of local 
communities—when coupled with an emphasis on the rule of law, legal reform, and 
enforcement—can help us examine the Russian environmental management system. 
Combining these perspectives and borrowing from my work in a U.S. domestic context 
(Wernstedt, 2001), we can look at the Russian environmental management system through 
three lenses.   
•  If economic incentives are to improve environmental performance in Russia, 
suitable conditions need to be in place for economic actors to perform as desired 
(Gustafffson 1998).  These include the basics of a market economy, with 
competitive markets, trade in private goods, the minimization of externalities 
that distort markets, reliable institutions that can administer incentive systems, 
and no formal barriers to prevent the exit or entry of economic actors.  The latter 
also requires low transaction costs and symmetric access to information by 
economic actors so they can participate in economic activities.  In addition, 
practically speaking, incentives have to be set at a level that encourages 
economic actors to alter their behavior in order to achieve desired outcomes.   
•  Formal and informal institutions must be in place to advance environmental 
interests, most notably a legal framework that provides accountability and 
direction to environmental actors.  This framework, at its core, depends on what 
has been called a culture of compliance (Bell, 2000), a set of values in which 
law has a social legitimacy and is respected as a compass to direct desirable 
social behavior.  Such a culture is not an innate feature of any society, but rather 
is encouraged through example and by realistic expectations and a real prospect 
of enforcement.  The latter threat must be credible, with penalties severe enough Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
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to discourage undesirable environmental behavior and monitoring strong enough 
that the probability of detecting undesirable behavior is high.  
•  A key ingredient of community empowerment—particularly in the context of 
building a civil society—is a robust culture of information. This must include 
adequate and timely collection and maintenance of environmental information, 
as well as dissemination of this to community or civil actors.  The information 
must be reliable and relevant, and institutions must be in place so that the 
community actors can use the information to participate in environmental 
deliberations (Tietenberg and Wheeler 1998).  There must be opportunities to 
build broad-based coalitions of community, environmental, and economic actors 
that can fashion environmental agendas they find acceptable. 
Drawing on various pieces of evidence—the Siberian example and the RLMS and 
William Davidson Institute data referenced earlier, a survey of Russian nongovernmental 
environmental organizations that I conducted, several joint U.S.-Russian workshops on 
environmental decisionmaking that I have participated in, and academic writings—I apply 
the above three constructs to examine Russian environmental management, highlighting both 
the basic elements of each construct and its relevance to Russia.  Table 1 summarizes this 
discussion.   
5.  Market Mechanisms 
Russian policymakers and researchers have long shown great enthusiasm for using 
economic incentives to encourage better environmental performance.  Peterson and Bielke 
(2001) note that fines, fees, and credits were features of environmental policy even during the 
Soviet reign, and Viktor Danilov-Danilyan, the long-term head of Goskomekologiya and an 
academic economist by training, heavily promoted these in the post-Soviet era.  In addition, 
these mechanisms have garnered support from a wide array of groups.  For example, in what 
was one of the most visible gatherings of the Russian environmental community in the 
1990s—the second All-Russia Congress on Nature Protection held in 1999—attendees 
adopted the goal of setting higher prices for natural resources to reflect their true economic 
value as Russian’s main environmental policy.  The group also supported widespread use of 
economic instruments to achieve this goal.  Notwithstanding this keen interest in economic Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
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incentives, it is clear that many of the necessary conditions for the successful use of market 
incentives to improve environmental performance are missing or, at best, incomplete.   
Market Institutions 
Despite a decade of reform, many of the prerequisites of competitive markets in Russia 
are poorly developed (Toman & Simpson, 1994; Stiglitz, 1999; Brezinski & Fritsch, 1997).  
The importance of the informal sector and the dominance of the state even in world-market 
driven, export-oriented sectors such as oil mean that many economic actors in Russia still do 
not face fully competitive market pressures.  As an indicator of this continuing weakness, 
more than 70% of respondents to the October 2000 RLMS reported that they worked for an 
enterprise or organization that was owned or partially owned by the government (Mroz et al., 
2001).  This evinced a substantial decline since the early 1990s, but even so, 29% of personal 
income still came from such enterprises in 2000 and another 34% from state transfers such as 
pensions.  Roughly 20% came from small-scale, labor-intensive household activities in the 
informal sector, and less than 10% came from fully private enterprises in the formal part of 
the economy.  This does not mean that private enterprises are not significant contributors to 
the Russian economy—they are particularly in the services, retail trade, and information 
technology sectors—but it does highlight the fact that the extent of profit-maximizing 
economic behavior in the society is still much more limited than in Western economies.  In 
such a setting, market incentives are likely to have a muted effect, at best.   
Government environmental entities, such as the Nizhnevartovsk Environmental 
Committee, typically lack trained staff economists or financial experts and managers to 
design incentive programs.  The tax, subsidy, and investment policies of economic and 
financial entities, such as the Finance Ministry, have far greater influence on the environment 
than do the policies of environmental entities, and the latter are further marginalized by 
recurring reorganizations, budget shortfalls, and competition with natural resource agencies 
(Peterson, 1997a).  In most cases, regulatory compliance costs are not evaluated or 
considered by environmental agencies.  In addition, the importance of costs as a criterion in 
environmental decisionmaking appears relatively low, at least from the perspective of 
environmental NGOs surveyed at the second All-Russia Congress on Nature Protection.  As 
Table 2 shows, nearly three-quarters of NGO respondents to a question on important factors Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
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in environmental protection placed costs in the lower tier of factors to consider when taking 
an action to protect the environment.   
The Virtual Economy 
The ability to continue to externalize significant environmental costs of production 
(such as spillage from oil pipeline leaks) and avoid accountability for such actions among 
even private enterprises means that many possible market incentives are ineffectual from the 
start.  Moreover, the transaction costs of participating in incentive schemes that require 
investments in physical capital to promote production efficiencies can be extraordinarily high 
relative to the costs of networking with regulators and other stakeholders.  The virtual 
economy theory advanced by Gaddy and Ickes (1998) asserts that many Russian enterprises 
operate at a considerable distance from a competitive market economy, in the sense that 
economic relations, even for private enterprises, are dominated by barter, negotiation over 
favorable tax treatment, unstable interenterprise contractual arrangements, tight social 
obligations to local communities, and other factors that are the antithesis of a well-
functioning, competitive market economy.  Responding to market incentives to protect the 
environment, or even investing in physical capital to promote maximum production 
efficiency and profit, may be far from optimal behavior. Rather, enterprises invest in 
relational capital—goodwill with local, regional, and federal authorities—by providing 
services, bribes, or other favors that later can be used to secure favorable treatment.   
Although the oil industry is far more export-oriented than most Russian economic 
sectors, it, too, faces clear incentives to nourish the local relationships that are the hallmark 
of a virtual economy.  Even Russian oil companies that are large by world standards and used 
their cash-rich position to increase investment sharply after 1999 (Tavernise, 2001) are not 
fully exposed to market forces.  For example, the chief executive of TNK, one of Russia’s 
major oil companies, felt compelled to relocate from the company’s Moscow headquarters to 
the company’s main fields at Samotlor near Nizhnevartovsk to oversee faltering reforms that 
were intended to break out of Soviet-era management habits (The Economist, 2001).  These 
habits included reluctance among senior managers to share information within the company 
and a lack of commitment to cost control and conservation, traits alien to a market economy 
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15 
Insufficiency of Incentives 
Even when economic incentive schemes are put in place, the incentives may be too low 
to alter behavior.  For instance, the Nizhnevartovsk Environmental Committee issued 80 
fines for nearly $2.5 million to polluting enterprises in 1995—the latest year for which 
figures are available—with much of this directed at the oil pipeline spills.  Many of these 
fines were never collected, but even if they had been, their low-level cost relative to 
mitigation costs meant their revenue raising properties always would significantly outweigh 
the incentive effects for changing behavior and enhancing environmental quality.  This is a 
pervasive problem in Russia, one that bedevils both the use of incentives and the threat of 
enforcement in many environmental media.  For example, Golub and Gurvich (1994) have 
suggested that, across Russia, air emission charges would have to increase thirty-fold to have 
any behavioral effects beyond those already provided by often unevenly applied command-
and-control regulations.   
A further barrier to greater use of incentive-based approaches is that significant 
behavioral changes could lead to industry slowdowns, threatening both the funding of 
environmental authorities and the livelihood of residents dependent on the sector against 
which enforcement actions are being taken.  In Nefteyugansk, for example, an oil town of 
about 100,000 people in Khanti Mansii, 30% to 40% of local residents would lose their 
means of financial support with industry restructuring, perhaps one third of these directly as a 
result of layoffs (McKinsey Global Institute, 1998). Many of these residents have little ability 
to move out of the region, due in part to continuing de facto residency permit requirements in 
parts of the country and the absence of developed housing and labor markets.  In addition, 
low incomes make migration to other areas and sectors prohibitively expensive for many 
workers.4  Local governments, who fear calamitous drops in tax revenues and enterprise-
provided social services, also can resist proposed market reforms and layoffs by threatening 
the revocation of oil licenses.   
                                                 
4 Despite an increase in average Russian household income over the last two years, average income levels 
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6.  Rule of Law and Civil Society 
It is well recognized that a civil society and the rule of law and its effective enforcement 
are weak in present-day Russia.  Results from the William Davidson Institute’s survey of 
economic experts just prior to the 2000 Russian presidential elections suggest the primacy of 
building a civil society and legal system of protection. Nearly 60% of all survey respondents 
ranked “establishing a rule of law” as the most important area that the newly elected Russian 
leader should focus on (from a list of 13 choices), while more than 85% identified it as one of 
the three most important areas. More than three quarters of the experts within Russia and 
Central and Eastern Europe ranked the state of the civil and legal systems as the primary 
problem and all identified it as one of the two most important areas.  More specific to 
environmental policies, Table 3 shows that two thirds of the environmental NGOs surveyed 
at the second All-Russia Congress on Nature Protection identified improving legislation as 
one of the top priorities in the mission to improve environmental policies.  Unfortunately, the 
zeal for legal and regulatory reform runs into several fundamental structural problems in 
Russian society that can sabotage such efforts.   
Implementation and Enforcement Issues 
Despite abundant interest in the rule of law and the primacy of legal requirements—as 
Table 2 shows, nearly 90% of NGO respondents identified legal requirements as one of the 
most important factors to consider in environmental decisionmaking—the more pragmatic 
aspects of a law-based civil society to promote environmental protection may receive only 
passing attention in Russia.  For example, the Russian environmental NGO community 
appears to put a relatively low priority on the implementation or enforcement sides of 
environmental actions, a view at odds with the priority placed on improving legislation.  
Table 2 shows that fewer than one-quarter of NGO respondents put implementability in the 
top three factors to consider when taking an action to protect the environment, while Table 3 
indicates that only about one-third of respondents identified enforcement as a top priority for 
improving environmental policy.  Bell (2000), among others, has written of the “aspirational” 
nature of much lawmaking in Russia, referring to laws that are written for their “exhortatory” 
value with little expectation they ever will be enforced.   Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
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As an adjunct to implementation shortfalls, the capacity for effective enforcement of 
laws is limited, thus expectations for compliance are often unrealistic.  This in part reflects 
the problem identified earlier, namely that the principle enforcement threats and drivers of 
compliance—fines and penalties for violating pollution standards—are relatively low.  They 
need to provide critical revenue to employ cash-starved environmental committees, and thus 
cannot be too high so as to change enterprise behavior and starve the committees.  In 
addition, the common practice of recycling some of the revenues from the fines back to 
enterprises to mitigate damage means that the net cost of these to enterprises are often quite 
low, thus further dampening the incentive for compliance.   
Monitoring 
Environmental monitoring, a staple of enforcement, is difficult in Russia because the 
vastness of the territory can make it prohibitively expensive.  Across Russia as a whole, each 
station in the water quality monitoring network covers an area greater than 9,000 square 
kilometers on average, with stations in the more isolated parts of central and eastern Russia 
covering areas more than 250,000 square kilometers.  To complicate matters, monitoring 
traditionally is not set up to meet effluent standards.  The vast and sophisticated network of 
the national hydrometeorological and environmental monitoring system (Roshydromet), for 
example, focuses on surface ambient conditions and long-term forecasts of environmental 
conditions, rather than on effluent quality (Zhulidov et al., 2000).  This allows the monitoring 
of environmental outcomes but is poorly suited for determining where site-specific discharge 
violations are occurring.   
In addition, the direct relevance of the monitoring for public health typically is low.  For 
example, human health considerations have appeared only indirectly as concerns of the 
Nizhnevartovsk Environmental Committee, a feature that reflects the fact that drinking water 
and water quality have been in the jurisdiction of agencies other than Goskomekologiya.  In 
general, monitoring around the country aims at identifying overall contamination of the 
environment rather than at quantifying actual human exposure or directly informing near-
time environmental management operational decisions (Thomas & Orlova, 2001; Revich & 
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Corruption 
Finally, the pervasiveness of corruption in Russia cannot be overemphasized. In 2001, 
Transparency International—an international nongovernmental organization that monitors 
government accountability and corruption—ranked only 10 countries lower than Russia in 
terms of corruption, drawing on corruption surveys of 91 countries that have been conducted 
by different organizations.  In the Russian virtual economy described previously, enterprises 
act rationally when they invest in personal and extra-legal “relational capital” with 
government bureaucracies and individuals rather than adhere to formal legal and regulatory 
prescriptions.  This can take the form of petty infractions—bribes to relatively low-level 
officials to ignore environmental violations, for example—or activities at higher-levels that 
may have a long-lasting effect on the economy, as occurred during privatization in the 1990s.   
7.  Information Provision and Community Participation 
Information provision in principle has been an important part of the official Russian 
environmental apparatus, and citizen access to information is a right provided by the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation.  In addition, the 1991 Law on Environmental 
Protection and the 1995 Law on Specially Protected Natural Areas provides citizens the right 
to request information regarding pollution as well as legal standing to assist state agencies in 
providing environmental protection.  The 1995 Russian Federation Information Act provides 
state agencies a legal way to collect information and publicize it (Harman-Stokes, 1995; 
Ostergren, 2001).  
In practice, however, access to government data has long been problematic in Russia, 
even for technical specialists working in government agencies.  This is due to classification 
of data based on security concerns as well as bureaucratic turf battles.  More recently, 1997 
regulations that allow Roshydromet to sell information to nonfederal users—a policy that 
also has been applied to federal users—has imposed costs that effectively make the data 
unavailable (Zhulidov et al., 2000).  In addition, decisionmaking in Russia has historically 
been viewed as hierarchical and top-down (Schecter, 1998; Wedel, 1998).  This complicates 
efforts to provide information and encourage community involvement in several ways. Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
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Public Involvement and the Role of Experts 
Examinations by Russian and Western organizations and individuals involved in 
international collaboration have identified the vital role for the public to participate in 
environmental management in Russia (London Initiative on the Russian Environment, 1998).  
Yet, reliance on technical solutions and the exclusion of nonexperts from decisionmaking is a 
cultural tradition and pervasive practice in Soviet and Russian environmental decisionmaking 
(Bell, 2001; Weiner, 1999).  To some extent, environmental NGOs are fighting this tradition.  
Table 4 shows, for example, the importance to many NGOs of public educational activities 
and information dissemination through the media.  Iakimet’s (1999) study of more than 150 
Russian environmental NGOs reveals similar patterns, characterizing NGO principal 
activities as collecting and disseminating ecological information and ecological education 
(assistance to local populations also appears as an important focus in contrast to the NGO 
survey).  However, both surveys indicate that direct action through education of local 
officials, lobbying, and environmental rehabilitation is very limited. This in large part reflects 
the fact that most NGOs lack a point-of-entry to decisionmaking, particularly at the regional 
level (Yanitsky 1999, cited in Tysiachniouk & Karpov, 1998).  It also derives from the 
composition of environmental NGOs, many of which are made up of predominantly 
scientific and technical experts.   
Such expertise constitutes one of the traditional strengths of the Russian environmental 
NGO sector, but it comes at a cost.  Tysiachniouk and Karpov (1998) argue that many NGO 
representatives “insist on the necessity for ‘professionalism’ and ‘scientific approval’ in 
decision-making,” and place a low or negligible value on experiential evidence contributed 
by local citizens.  Thus, the connection between NGOs and the communities in which they 
work is frequently weak, a systemic problem that is a symptom of the paucity of crosscutting 
ties to reinforce Russia’s weak civil society (Peterson, 1997b).  The bias toward scientifically 
credible solutions can diminish opportunities for public involvement, because the bias 
devalues compromise and interest group negotiation.  In addition, the scientific and technical 
base has meant that interest and expertise in policy analysis among NGO activists typically 
has been limited.  Looking back at Table 2, this perspective is well represented.  More than 
two-thirds of the environmental NGO respondents believe that an action’s scientific 
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exceeded only by the high importance placed on legal requirements.  The view of the local 
public lags behind this by 25 percentage points, and the views of local industry and local 
government appear to be even less-important considerations.   
The focus on technical solutions and exclusion of nonexpert views bedevils 
environmental performance. In the Nizhnevartovsk area, for example, the most sought after 
contribution from an expert international team studying local water quality problems was for 
the team to publicly support the NEC’s proposals for infrastructure improvements, despite 
the apparent lack of broad public support and funds for the improvements.  Apparently 
developed independent of local preferences, capacity expansion was identified in a circular 
fashion. A closed group of experts simultaneously defined it as the principal problem that 
needed to be addressed and chose it as the solution to the problem.  There appeared to be 
little or no effort at public outreach to help with problem formulation, and no mechanisms to 
include community input in decisionmaking.  Softer, nonengineered solutions to the water 
problems—such as demand-side management through pricing to ease treatment burdens—
were not vetted and had no advocate, even though evidence from Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Baltic countries suggests that pricing can reduce treatment needs considerably 
(Peterson, 2000a).  In sum, the technical focus defined the goal as increasing the delivery 
volume of treated drinking water and wastewater, rather than providing quality service to the 
public while maintaining productivity and profitability to the drinking water and wastewater 
treatment providers.   
Coalition Building 
In a review of foreign environmental assistance efforts, Powell (undated) has identified 
relationship building among NGOs, the state sector, enterprises, the media, and the public as 
critical influences on the development of a civil society and environmental progress.  Such 
coalitions are particularly essential in Russia due to the nascent rule of law and weakness of 
the state vis-à-vis industrial and commercial interests, limited channels for societal input into 
governmental decisionmaking, and the tight connection between environmental problems and 
economic issues referenced at the outset.  In such a setting, personal connections and a form 
of the relational capital described by Gaddy and Ickes (1998) are essential elements.  
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but rather can draw on material self-interest.  Indeed, effective coalitions for environmental 
progress may not even include environmental NGOs. For example, recent efforts to phase-
out leaded gasoline in some regions of Russia have been successful largely because regional 
governments and refining enterprises collaborated to create a competitive monopolistic 
advantage undergirded by regional bans on leaded gasoline (Thomas & Orlova, 2001).  
The evidence presented in Table 5 suggests that coalition building and working with a 
diverse group of stakeholders can be a challenging task for many environmental NGOs.  
While the two leftmost columns indicate that a relatively high percentage of NGO 
respondents “always” or “usually” work with the listed groups—led by the 92% of 
respondents who “always” or “usually” work with scientists—more than 40% of the 
respondents indicated they only “occasionally” or “seldom or never” work with local 
government officials, agencies, and the local public.  Most tellingly, 92% of NGO 
respondents only “occasionally” or “seldom or never” work with industry. 
View from a Workshop on Environmental Decisionmaking 
The exclusion of important stakeholders and reliance on experts as opposed to local, 
coalition-based solutions in NGO activities is further highlighted by a set of joint American-
Russian workshops on environmental decisionmaking.  These consisted of two 
environmental prioritization exercises in 1997 and 1998 and one public participation 
workshop in 1999.  The latter in particular explored interest group involvement in setting 
environmental requirements, using an example from the United States and examining the 
applicability of this to Russia (see Bell, 2001 for a description of this workshop).  Despite 
much pre-workshop consultation between the Russian and American organizers, most of the 
Russian delegation—which was led by the Center for Russian Environmental Policy, 
arguably the most influential national NGO environmental policy group in Russia—seemed 
much less interested in the process of public participation and the negotiation of goals and 
approaches for achieving these than in identifying new technical means to achieve 
exogenously-determined environmental goals.   
This focus derives in part from the legacy of the autonomy of decisionmaking entities 
and their insulation from broader public input.  In fact, the Russian delegation itself appeared 
dubious that citizens or nonexperts could play a legitimate role in policy formulation.  This Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
22 
disbelief likely reflected their experience that citizens historically have not had substantive 
access to decisionmakers, but it also rested on an apparent disdain for the contribution of 
nonexperts to policy solutions.  Only one NGO representative from the Russian delegation, 
who also was a member from a local city council, seemed to view citizen participation 
favorably, drawing on her own efforts to link citizens, government officials, and industry to 
address environmental problems.  In general, as observed by one American participant in the 
workshop, the Russian delegation believed that attracting money and other resources for 
technical solutions was more critical to addressing environmental problems than attracting 
widespread support from nonexperts. 
8.  Conclusions and Opportunities for the Future 
In light of the litany of difficulties with market incentives, the rule of law, and reliance 
on community pressure in the Russian environmental context, it is no mystery that Russian 
environmental management often appears riddled with contradictions.  Basic market and 
legal institutions that lie at the core of any effective environmental management system 
historically have been weak, and sociocultural traditions, such as the open sharing of 
information among an array of expert and nonexpert stakeholders, and the civil society found 
in many other countries are thin. The well-developed human capital of the Russian scientific 
and technical establishment cannot surmount these obstacles alone.  Given the legacy of 
heavy industrialization over the last 75 years, a contracting economy and population over the 
last 10 years, and pervasive corruption, aspirations for quick improvements in environmental 
management are not likely to be realized. 
This is not to say that no such improvements have emerged.  Notwithstanding the above 
comments, more people from different walks of life now participate in what are often more 
inclusive environmental decision forums in Russia.  The public participation workshop 
described above included government representatives, elected officials, scientists, and 
business people.  More open and substantive exchange of ideas took place in the workshop 
than would have been the case 10 years earlier, and the hunger of the Russian delegation for 
implementable ideas was a step forward from the aspirational past.  This was not without its 
own problems—the desire for cookbook approaches ignored the all-important institutional 
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positions toward pragmatic approaches to moving forward.  In addition, an array of 
thousands of indigenous Russian environmental NGOs have worked on the ground in Russia 
with some notable successes at the local level, despite continuing harassment with 
inspections, unfavorable tax treatment, and other hurdles placed by governing authorities. 
According to the evidence collected in the NGO survey, public education has been one of the 
most effective activities for improving environmental policies and promoting it is one of the 
highest priorities.   
What, then, are the most promising prospects for improving environmental management 
and policy in Russia? Unfortunately, there are no silver bullets or ready answers to this 
question.  Clearly, as numerous commentators have argued, fundamental improvements in 
Russian environmental management require fundamental reshaping of Russian institutions.  
This includes establishing more competitive real-market relations rather than virtual 
economic ones, establishing a rule of law, decreasing corruption significantly, implementing 
a tax code that is transparent and does not penalize environmental compliance, and attracting 
foreign direct investments that provide management and technological improvements rather 
than what is often perceived to be second-rate technology and lower levels of environmental 
protection.  It also likely requires instilling in businesses and individuals a sense of 
environmentally responsible behavior.  This is a difficult tightrope act when enterprises face 
market pressures to shed themselves of the historical social responsibilities they have had to 
local communities, and citizens search for meaningful ways to be civically engaged in the 
face of day-to-day economic pressures.   
Short of seismic institutional shifts, a number of less ambitious efforts could improve 
environmental performance.  Here I will focus on those related primarily to environmental 
NGOs.  Since the demise of Goskomekologiya in 2000, the visibility of these NGOs and 
their cooperation with each other has improved markedly.  I would argue that modest 
improvements could be made on at least three fronts.   
Legal Status of NGOs 
Placing NGOs on solid legal and tax footing within the Russian Federation of laws and 
codes is a long-sought goal, the attainment of which would enhance the stability of NGOs.  
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and lower their vulnerability to harassment from the state.  At present, the tax policies toward 
NGOs (as with all nonstate entities) are vague and uncertain, lack clearly outlined legal 
grounds, and are ad hoc (Polischuk, 1997).  However, prospects for improving the legal 
status of NGOs are mixed.  One the one hand, President Putin has publicly expressed support 
for the NGO movement, welcoming its growth and calling for a continuing constructive 
dialogue with the government (Goble, 2001c).  On the other hand, commentators have 
speculated that much of the rhetoric about supporting NGOs and a civil society is camouflage 
for an NGO sector that is largely government driven (Goble, 2001a); harassment of NGOs 
continues and, in some cases, has intensified (Peterson, 2000b).  How this will play out over 
the next several years is a matter of internal Russian politics.  However, international 
pressure, coupled with Russia’s desire to join or become a full fledged member of 
international organizations such as the World Trade Organization and G-8, provide 
incentives for legal and fiscal reform that strengthens the legitimacy and stability of NGOs. 
Building Coalitions for Local Support 
Much of the success of the Russian environmental NGO movement has rested on 
grassroots effort that have flourished in part because they operate under the radar of national 
and regional authorities.  To be sure, the local, grassroots character of an NGO does not 
appear to be an important predictor of whether the NGO will be successful (Powell, undated).  
In fact, with tight finances and often narrow dependence on a charismatic leader, grassroots 
organizations are particularly vulnerable to dissolution or takeover by local economic and 
political powers.  However, unlike the scientific societies during most of the Soviet era—
whose “mass support” was largely restricted to teachers, students, and nonparticipating 
employees of the ministries and factories recruited to support the societies (Weiner, 1999)—
many of the most effective environmental NGOs in the post-Soviet era have established 
legitimacy and found some success by drawing on local, grassroots support.  They have 
campaigned for local referenda, organized protests, and promoted healthier local 
environments, yet avoided visibility and threats to powerful national or regional interests.  
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Russian citizens than distant NGO or governmental actors—even given a strong historical 
orientation toward the center—because of the collapse of many central institutions.5   
According to a 2001 poll by the Public Opinion Foundation, only 5% of Russians 
participate in public organizations and nearly 75% say they have no interest in doing so 
(Goble, 2001b).  This may reflect a historic distrust of institutional agendas for change.  
Regardless, broadening the base of civic engagement through active outreach and 
accompanying public relations on issues elemental to many Russians and people elsewhere—
land, public health, economic livelihoods, and local community protection—would help to 
establish a broader political legitimacy.  Coalition building is critical in this regard.  
Partnering with local enterprises—both to work on pollution control efforts and as a possible 
partner or donor to local community foundations—and joining with local citizens, religious 
groups, elected officials, and government bureaucrats, is essential in an environment where 
relational capital is a key driver of decisions and where courts of law lack the independence 
or standing to guarantee basic protections.  As such, long-term assistance to improve 
outreach, public relations, and coalition building skills may yield high payoffs.   
A Role for Grounded Policy Analysis 
Finally, there is a need for more independent and rigorous assessment of policies 
affecting Russian environmental planning and management.  Most importantly, these 
assessments must be grounded in the realities of Russian institutional failures and individual, 
enterprise, and government behavior. Independent policy analysis is in its formative years in 
Russia, a condition that reflects both limited resources and the state and direction of social 
science in the Soviet era.  Recently, organizations conducting independent policy analysis 
have emerged in Russia, some focusing primarily on environmental policy and others on 
analytically sophisticated techniques in the western tradition.6   
                                                 
5 A survey of more than 3,000 residents in Siberian cities shortly after Putin eliminated Goskomekologiya 
indicated that more than 80% of respondents believed it was essential for Russia to have an independent 
committee for protecting the environment.  However, more than 60% of respondents did not know that the State 
Committee had been abolished (Kutepova, 2001). 
6 In addition to the Center for Russian Environmental Policy see, for example, the Center for Economic and 
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The unstable nature of Russian environmental institutions makes the straightforward 
application of policy analysis—always a dicey proposition even in the most receptive 
institutional environment—an extreme long shot.  A potentially more fruitful model warrants 
consideration: a mixed approach where a coalition of policy analysts, representatives of 
enterprises and government officials, and other stakeholders operate on a scale where 
problems are realistically susceptible to intervention.  This model, while still drawing on the 
respect afforded to experts and their scientific and technical expertise, could enlarge the locus 
of decisionmaking to include an array of stakeholders.  Such an approach could push Russian 
environmental policy and management decisions in a more desirable and less enigmatic 
direction that advances both Russia’s and the world’s self interest. 
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TABLE 1. Concepts and Experiences in Russian Environmental Management. 
 
Element Description   
Market Mechanisms 
Private Markets  Concept:  private market dominates relations among economic actors 
  Experience:  state and combined state/private enterprises are principal sources of income to economic actors 
Competitive Relations  Concept:  economic actors act rationally to maximize profits 
  Experience:  virtual economy dominates in many sectors, and economic actors invest in relational capital 
Institutions  Concept:  state institutions sufficiently established to administer incentives to economic actors 
  Experience:  not enough expertise in environmental agencies to do economic analysis, costs of actions seen by many 
as low concern, environmental agencies less influential than finance and economic agencies 
Incentives  Concept:  incentive systems sufficient to alter behavior of economic actors 
  Experience:  fines and fees set too low to alter behavior, environmental agencies depend on fines/fees as revenue 
source, environmental agencies face pressure to avoid actions that might threaten local livelihoods 
  
Civil Society 
Deterrence  Concept:  legal penalties sufficiently harsh to deter negative behavior by environmental actors 
  Experience:  implementation of laws and regulations not a high priority, poor record of enforcement and collection 
of fees and fines, recycling of fines and fees to environmental actors softens the impact 
Credibility  Concept:  threats posed to environmental actors by penalties are credible 
  Experience:  widespread corruption in enforcement of regulation, laws are “aspirational” and not expected to be met  
Monitoring  Concept:  capability to monitor actions of environmental actors is well established 
  Experience:  vast area to monitor with limited funds, focus on ambient conditions rather than discharges 
 
Information and Community Involvement 
Collection  Concept:  relevant information for community actors is collected in a timely fashion 
  Experience:  access restricted for many users, costs of information are prohibitive 
Public Involvement  Concept:  opportunities for community actors to use information to participate in decisionmaking 
  Experience:  tradition of top-down, hierarchical decisionmaking, reliance on scientific and technical experts 
Coalitions  Concept:  ability to build coalitions of community, economic, and environmental actors to advance mutual agendas 
  Experience:  history of weak coalition building, limited experience among NGOs in working with broad coalitions 
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Table 2:  What do you believe should be the most important factors to consider 
when taking an action to protect a natural resource or to control pollution?  Rank 
from 1 to 9, with 1 indicating the most important factor?** 
 top  3
rd* middle  3
rd* bottom  3
rd* 
legal requirements  89  7 4 
views of local government  19  33  48 
views of local public  43  39 18 
views of local industry  4  41  56 
cost of action  4  25  71 
scientific justification  68  18 14 
implementability  24  52 24 
fairness to other groups  4  52  43 
reduction of risk  38  46  15 
*The three rightmost columns refer to rank terciles.  For example, the leftmost 
of the three columns (headed by “top 3
rd”) represents the percentage of respondents 
who ranked the factor in the top one-third of factors, while the rightmost of the three 
columns (headed by “bottom 3
rd”) represent the percentage of respondents 
who ranked the factor in the bottom one-third of factors.  Row totals may not add to 
100, due to rounding. 
**Survey respondents are NGO attendees at the 2
nd All Russia Congress on Nature 
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Table 3:  What are your priorities for improving environmental policies?  Rank 
from 1 to 8, with 1 indicating the area that needs the most attention.** 
 top  3
rd* middle  3
rd* bottom  3
rd* 
improved legislation  66  14 21 
improved enforcement  34  55 10 
increased penalties  24  28  48 
increased public involvement  41  55  3 
higher funding  7  54  39 
increased use of market incentives  34  34  31 
increased use of science  22  41  37 
increased education  52  38  10 
*The three rightmost columns refer to rank terciles.  For example, the leftmost 
of the three columns (headed by “top 3
rd”) represents the percentage of respondents 
who ranked the factor in the top one-third of priorities, while the rightmost of the three 
columns (headed by “bottom 3
rd”) represent the percentage of respondents who 
ranked the factor in the bottom one-third of priorities.  Row totals may not add to 
100 due to rounding.  
**Survey respondents are NGO attendees at the 2
nd All Russia Congress on Nature 
Protection held in Saratov, Russia in June 1999 
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Table 4:  In what activities has your NGO been the most effective?  Rank from 1 to 
10, with 1 indicating the most effective activity.**   
 top  3
rd* middle  3
rd* bottom  3
rd* 
public education  44  48 8 
protection of natural areas  40  24  36 
improved scientific decision base  44  32 24 
assistance of local populations  9  35  57 
environmental legislation  13  48  39 
environmental research  40  20  40 
environmental rehabilitation  0  19  81 
media coverage of environment  52  24 24 
environmental monitoring  13  39  48 
education of officials  17  21  63 
*The three rightmost columns refer to rank terciles.  For example, the leftmost 
of the three columns (headed by “top 3
rd”) represents the percentage of respondents 
who ranked the activity in the top one-third of effective activities, while the rightmost 
of the three columns (headed by “bottom 3
rd”) represents the percentage of respondents 
who ranked the activity in the bottom one-third of effective activities.  Row totals may 
not add to 100 due to rounding. 
**Survey respondents are NGO attendees at the 2
nd All Russia Congress on Nature 
Protection held in Saratov, Russia in June 1999 
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Table 5:  How often does your NGO work with the following groups?**   
 always*  usually*  occasionally*  seldom 
or never* 
scientists  70  22  4 4 
educators 40  28  28  4 
local elected officials  15  42  12  31 
local govt. institutions  15  41  30  15 
business/industry 0  8  46  46 
local public  30  30  26  15 
other Russian NGOs  42  23  31  4 
international NGOs  38  19  31  12 
*The numbers in the table represent the percentage of respondents who selected 
the choices identified at the top of the column.  Row totals may not add to 100 due to 
rounding.  
**Survey respondents are NGO attendees at the 2
nd All Russia Congress on Nature 
Protection held in Saratov, Russia in June 1999 
 Resources for the Future                                                                                               Wernstedt 
32 
Figure 1. Khanty Mansi Autonomous Region and Nizhnevartovsk, Russia 
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